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I. INTRODUCTION
An independent legal profession is said to be “the bulwark of a
free and democratic society.” 1 It is also said that a high measure of
independence of mind and action by legal actors is necessary for the
maintenance of the rule of law. 2 However, too often, there is the
allegation (within the sociological literature in particular) that the legal
profession has used the concepts of independence and the rule of law
as a shield or cuirass rather than as a sword. 3 The image of lawyers
representing unpopular clients fearlessly and advocating on behalf of
unpopular causes, so as to uphold legal rights, is replaced with images
of lawyers using these self-same concepts to preserve the status quo,4
favor those with high social status 5 and pursue self-regulation for selfinterest rather than for any so-called public interest. 6
It is against this contested terrain that this Article looks at, from a
comparative perspective, regulatory efforts in both the United States
and South Africa (“SA”) in untraditional and controversial ways to
address what these countries perceive as societal failings. In particular,
1. Julie Debeljak, Judicial Independence in the Modern Democratic State, 74 AUSTL. L.
REFORM COMMISSION REFORM J. 35, 38 (1999).
2. See Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Inequality and the Subversion of the Rule of Law, 4 SUR
INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 26, 45 (2007); Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for
the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2704 (2012). See generally GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 146.
3. See, e.g., William Saunderson-Meyer, South Africa’s Lawyers Should Be Desperately
Ashamed,
THOUGHT
LEADER
(Mar.
8,
2014),
https://thoughtleader.co.za/
williamsaundersonmeyer/2014/03/08/south-africas-lawyers-should-be-desperately-ashamed/
[https://perma.cc/W6Y3-KVTP]. See generally JAMES MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2014).
4. See KEITH M. MCDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 74-75 (1995)
(discussing how lawyers in seventeenth century England retained their status quo amidst the
political machinations of that era). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Lawyers in CrossCultural Perspective, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 1, 20-21 (R.L. Abel
& P.S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
5. See Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2761, 2762 (2012); see also Friedman, supra note 4, at 20-21.
6. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143 (2000). Kim makes the point that it may well be the case that “[i]t is economic
selfinterest, but not in the way we commonly think of it (for example, lawyers intentionally
lying to the public or regulators in order to line their own pockets). Rather, it is economic selfinterest warping cognition. It is vice, but not of a venal sort. It’s rather banal.” See Sung Hui
Kim, Naked Self-Interest: Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129,
159 (2011).
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this Article focuses on regulatory efforts in two particular areas: access
to justice (telling lawyers whom to represent); and access to the
profession (telling lawyers who should be amidst their number). While
regulation has traditionally told lawyers how they should represent
clients (i.e., issues around competency, confidentiality, etc.), regulatory
efforts in the United States appear to be telling the profession whom to
represent, and in South Africa, in addition to this, there is an attempt to
regulate affirmatively who should be part of the profession. A related
issue in the United States, which is touched on below, is the debate over
restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law. The purpose of this
Article, then, is to consider these efforts and their genesis in each
jurisdiction, and then look at whether these interventions will achieve
the outcomes desired by their makers.
This Article begins with a cautionary note. Scholars have repeated
the dangers of comparison where assumptions are made about the
similarity of role and work by legal professions in any particular
jurisdiction. 7 For example, Lewis and Abel consider that requirements
of the legal system influence, sometimes substantially, the behavior,
attributes and organization of lawyers, while at the same time not
discounting the possibility that lawyers may shape these requirements
for their own purposes. 8 Damaska further shows that fundamental
differences in the underlying principles of a court system will have very
important consequences for the role of lawyers in court proceedings. 9
Finally, Dezalay and Garth have demonstrated that the organization of
lawyering is closely tied to the position of the legal profession within
national states and the political and social contexts in which lawyers
operate. 10
7. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyers’ Professional Liability: Comparative Perspectives, 24
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73 (2017); see also Ronit Dinovitzer & Meghan Dawe, Early Legal
Careers in Comparative Context: Evidence from Canada and the United States, 23 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 83 (2016). See generally LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (R.L.
Abel & P.S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (R.L.
Abel & P.S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES (R.L. Abel
& P.S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
8. See generally Lawyers in Society: the Civil Law World, supra note 7; Lawyers in
Society: The Common Law World, supra note 7; Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories,
supra note 7.
9. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
10. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS:
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010).
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In terms of the comparison between the Unites States and South
Africa one could focus on the startling differences in the political,
social and economic contexts in which lawyers operate. The United
States is characterized as a developed nation with a staunch classic
liberalist and individualistic constitution, having broken away from its
British colonizers over 200 years ago. On the face of it, the organization
that regulates the profession, the American Bar Association (“ABA”),
is largely independent of the state.11 The ABA carries out this
regulation indirectly, by promulgating model ethical codes, versions of
which are later adopted by state court systems. 12 The ABA also
regulates entry into the legal profession more directly by setting out
detailed accreditation standards for US law schools. 13 It is also fair to
say that the legal system in the United States focuses on procedural
fairness and protection from the state. 14
In contrast, South Africa is a developing country which, while
breaking away from its British colonizers over 100 years ago, only
broke away from apartheid rule just over twenty years ago. In the postapartheid era, its constitution has many similarities to the US
Constitution in terms of the protection of individual rights but, in
contradistinction to the US Constitution, it has been described as
“social, redistributive, caring, positive, horizontal, participatory,
multicultural and self-conscious about its historic setting, and
transformative role and mission.” 15 It would then be fair to assume that
its legal profession would be structured in a way that emulates these
outcomes, if attention is paid to the commentators who emphasize the

11. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
27 (4th ed. 2016).
12. Id. at 36-39.
13. See 2018-2019 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 2017
ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar 1, 15-21.
14. Independence of the Legal Profession, ABA (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbar.
org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/
independence_of_the_legal_profession/ [https://perma.cc/5XFF-5GXC].
15. Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism 14 S. Afr. J. Hum.
Rts. 146, 152-53 (1998); Justice Sisi Khampepe, Lecture Delivered at Stellenbosch University’s
Annual Human Rights Lecture: Meaningful Participation as Transformative Process: The
Challenges of Institutional Change in South Africa’s Constitutional Democracy Lecture ¶ 31
(Oct. 6, 2016), available at https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/documents/
JusticeKhampepeAnnualHumanRightsLecture_6Oct_embargoedUntilAfterDelivery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CM4F-6RR5].

2018] LEGAL SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE US

377

importance of social and political contexts in shaping lawyer behavior
and role.
Notwithstanding, the structure of the legal profession in South
Africa (apart from its semi-divided nature into attorney and advocate)
has, to date, largely mimicked the US legal profession in uncanny ways
from its largely self-regulated position, to its demographic profile, to
its emphasis on autonomy as the proper end of the lawyer’s moral
role. 16 One question this Article examines is why this is the case –
particularly given the different circumstances of the US and SA legal
systems. Part of the answer can be found in the story of how the legal
profession has prioritized (or not) access to justice and access to the
profession.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section II sets out a
framework for analyzing the regulation of the legal professions of the
United States and South Africa. This Article suggests that there are
three categories of regulations that are used in both systems. Section III
discusses the regulation of the US legal profession and the ways
regulation has evolved. Section IV discusses similar issues for the
South African profession. Section V offers some comparative
observations between the US and SA legal professions. Section VI
provides concluding thoughts.
II. REGULATION OF THE US AND SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
PROFESSIONS: A THREE CATEGORY FRAMEWORK
There are at least three ways in which the legal professions in the
United States and South Africa are regulated. The first, and most
obvious, is the establishment of systems of attorney discipline. 17 In the
United States, courts enact the ethical rules, generally modeled on the
ABA Rules, and these serve as the primary basis for discipline of
attorneys. 18 Courts and legislatures also define professional
16. In fact, lawyer codes in South Africa (through the divided profession of attorneys and
advocates) make for less room for breaking attorney-client confidences than in the United States
(exceptions limited to money laundering). See Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 §1
(S. Afr.) which makes all legal practitioners and/or firms “accountable institutions” with duties
to report unusual transactions (with some qualifications – see section 37(2) on these
qualifications). See id. §§ 1, 37(2); see also Commencement of Certain Sections of the Legal
Practice Act, 2014, GG 42003 (29 Oct. 2018) (S. Afr.).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1166-68 (2009).
18. Lerman & Schrag, supra note 11, at 36-39.
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misconduct, which may go beyond violation of the ethical rules to
include “any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” (e.g.,
the failure to pay child support), 19 and establish the hearing procedures
and the penalties that may be imposed. 20 The state courts and
legislatures also impose requirements for registration of attorneys,
payment of fees into client protection funds, and continuing legal
education. 21 These regulations govern the behavior of individual
attorneys in their relationships with clients, adversaries and other
participants in the legal system, courts, and administrative agencies.
The regulations limit the autonomy of individual lawyers by telling
them what they must 22, may 23, or may not 24 do. This type of regulation
exists in all legal systems, although the US ethical rules, which are
supplemented by numerous ethics opinions and disciplinary decisions,
are probably more detailed and fully developed than in most other
countries. 25
In South Africa, while courts retain curial supervision over
lawyers in their admission and disbarment, the picture is slightly more
complex regarding this first category given (1) South Africa does not
19. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. L. §§ 90(2), (2-a) (McKinney 2018).
20. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1240 (2016).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. L. § 468-a (McKinney 2018); N.Y. STATE FIN. L. §97-t
(McKinney 2018); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §1500.1.
22. For example, lawyers must provide competent representation, see MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); must safeguard client funds and property, see
id., r. 1.15; and must take steps to ensure that subordinate lawyers comply with ethical
requirements, see id. r. 5.1.
23. For example, a lawyer may limit the scope of representation, if the limitation is
reasonable and the client gives informed consent, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); may disclose confidential information if a client gives informed
consent or if certain exceptions apply, see id. r. 1.6(a) and (b); and may, unless certain exceptions
apply, continue to represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest, if the client gives
informed consent to waive the conflict, see id. r. 1.7(b)(4).
24. For example, a lawyer may not bring or defend a legally or factually frivolous
proceeding, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); may not
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law the lawyer has previously made, see id. r. 3.3(a)(1); may not, when
representing a client, communicate on the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter without the other lawyer’s consent, see
id. r. 4.2; and, when dealing on behalf of a client, may not give advice to an unrepresented person
whose interests are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the
lawyer’s client, see id. r. 4.3.
25. See Philip M. Genty, The Challenges of Developing Cross-Cultural Legal Ethics
Education, Professional Development, and Guidance for the Legal Professions, J. PROF. L. 37,
41 (2011); see also Independence of the Legal Profession, supra note 14.

2018] LEGAL SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE US

379

operate under a highly federalized system as in the United States; and
(2) the legal profession has been divided to date, with advocates
(barristers) and attorneys (solicitors) making up the Bar and Side-BarBar respectively. 26
To date, the Bar was governed by the General Council of the Bar
(“the GCB”), a voluntary national association with relatively unfettered
powers of self-regulation. 27 The Side-Bar was regulated by provincial
law societies set up by statute, under the umbrella of a non-statutory
national law society. 28 Apart from particular statutory requirements
regarding payments to a fidelity fund (professional insurance), and
accounting checks, these societies have had almost exclusive freedom
to determine the standards for admission, draft codes of conduct, and
investigate and sanction attorney misconduct within disciplinary
committees. 29 This is in line with the rationale proffered in many
countries, as in the United States, that self-regulation is needed to
safeguard lawyers’ independence which, in turn, secures the best
chances of resisting any attempt by the state to infringe on the rights of
its people. 30
Thus, in relation to the first category, the task of disciplining
lawyers for misconduct has been largely left in the hands of the law
societies and the GCB. 31 However, where conduct is serious, the
societies and the GCB do not have the power to suspend or disbar
practitioners: an application has to be brought before a court by the law
societies, the GCB or the state attorney for this purpose. The courts also
have the power to impose costs on lawyers personally where their
conduct in a case is regarded as irresponsible or negligent (“de bonis

26. Kees van Dijkhorst & Jacqueline Church, Legal Practitioners, in 14(2) LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA ¶ 111 (W.A. Joubert ed., 2d ed. 2005).
27. The GCB was formed in 1946 and is a confederation of the provincial and local bars.
See GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR OF SOUTH AFRICA (Nov. 16, 1998),
https://www.sabar.co.za/ [https://perma.cc/E6CV-XPFB].
28. The provincial law societies—under the umbrella body of the Law Society of South
Africa (“LSSA”)—are the Cape Law Society, The Kwa-Zulu Natal Law Society, the Law
Society of the Free State, and the Law Society of the Northern Provinces.
29 See generally Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 (S. Afr.); Attorney’s Act 53 of
1979 (S. Afr.); Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (S. Afr.).
30. W. Bradley Wendel, Foreword: The Profession’s Monopoly and Its Core Values, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2563, 2564 (2014).
31 See Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 § 7(2) (S. Afr.); see also Dijkhorst &
Church, supra note 26, ¶ 123.
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propriis”). 32 Finally, courts are able to govern the direction of litigation
by requiring representatives in the court to comply with local court
directions and rules. 33 Where courts have found the conduct of an
attorney/advocate to be worthy of censure in his or her conduct before
them, apart from a costs order, the most the courts can do is to send a
copy of their judgment to the law society for further investigation. 34
A second category of regulation involves freedom of professional
speech and commercial law practice. In the United States, in a series of
decisions grounded in First Amendment and antitrust laws, courts have
invalidated specific provisions of state ethical rules that restricted the
ways attorneys were permitted to conduct their practices. These have
included minimum fee schedules 35 and restrictions on attorney
advertising. 36 This category is different from the first in that, while the
courts have limited the autonomy of the profession to regulate itself,
the rulings give individual lawyers greater economic autonomy in
competing for clients.
In South Africa, this category has particularly affected the
advocate’s profession – through the application of antitrust laws to
some of its practices. 37 In the early 2000s, and not without a fight from
32. See Lushaba v. MEC for Health 2015 (3) SA 616 (GJ) at ¶¶ 68-79 (S. Afr.), In this
case, the court indicated that costs would be awarded where the lawyers’ conduct substantially
and materially deviated from the standard expected of the legal practitioner. See id. Examples
of such conduct were dishonesty, obstruction of the interests of justice, irresponsible and grossly
negligent conduct, gross incompetence and grossly negligent conduct, litigating in a reckless
manner, misleading the court, gross incompetence and a lack of care.
33. These rules are made in accordance with Section 43 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of
1959. See Rules and Practice Directions, DEP’T: JUST. & CONST. DEV. OF REPUBLIC OF S. AFR.,
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/rules/rules.htm [https://perma.cc/6LVM-9DUM].
34. See, e.g., January v. Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. 2010(2235/2008) ZAECGHC
6, ¶ 3 (S. Afr.); City of Johannesburg v. WMA Winners Chapel Int’l 2013 (37432/2012)
ZAGPJHC 410, ¶ 8 (S. Afr.).
35. See generally Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down
minimum fee schedules as violating antitrust laws).
36. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (invalidating restrictions
on attorney advertising as violating the First Amendment); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598
F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that some content-based advertising restrictions in New
York rules violated the First Amendment).
37. This is not to say that the attorney’s profession has not been affected. As in the US
case, the Competition Commission has been concerned with restrictive rules by law societies
relating to marketing, advertising, and touting for legal service. These rules have been
challenged. See Venter v. Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 2013 (014688)
ZACT 103 (S. Afr.). However, the rules will only change when the Legal Practice Act comes
into force. See Dijkhorst & Church supra note 26.
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the GCB, 38 South Africa’s Competition Commission 39 managed to
invalidate certain provisions promoting restrictive practices within the
advocate’s profession. 40 Despite efforts by the Competition
Commission to restrict the referral rule (viz. that advocates may only
work through an attorney) as anticompetitive, this effort was not
successful due to procedural issues. 41 However, this is about to change
with new legislation not yet in force. 42
These first two categories have long histories and have earned at
least a degree of general acceptance within the profession as a whole
and among individual lawyers. 43 A third category is both more recent
and more controversial, especially in the United States. In the past
decade or so, there has been an effort in both countries to use
regulations to improve the delivery of legal services and address unmet
legal needs. Two approaches in the United States have been to
encourage the provision of pro bono services and to permit nonlawyers to provide certain types of legal services, while the focus in
South Africa has been on the provision of pro bono services. In
particular, there has been a push to improve access to the profession
itself. As will be discussed below, this third category of regulations has

38. The GCB litigated against the Competition Commission regarding its decision to
invalidate certain practices. See general Council of the Bar South Africa and Others v.
Commissioner, Competition Commission 2001 [4] All SA 597 (T) (S. Afr.). For a history of the
decision-making process, litigation in the high court and in the Supreme Court of Appeal of
South Africa, see Commissioner of the Competition Commission v. General Council of the Bar
South Africa and Others 2002 [4] All SA 145 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
39. Established under the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
40. The practices which were invalidated related to rules requiring two lawyers in
particular matters, the prohibition of partnerships within the Bar, the defaulters’ list, advertising,
tariff of fees, and location of premises. Prior to the litigation, the GCB conceded that the “closedshop” rule and the rule preventing the taking on of cases on a contingency basis were anticompetitive. See General Council of the Bar South Africa and Others v. Commissioner,
Competition Commission 2001 (4) All SA 597 (T) (S. Afr.); Commissioner of the Competition
Commission v. General Council of the Bar South Africa and Others 2002 (4) All SA 145 (SCA)
(S. Afr.).
41. See Commissioner of the Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar South
Africa 2002 (4) All SA 145 (SCA) at para 14-17 (S. Afr.). See also D Davis, G Marcus & J
Klaaren, Administration of Justice, in 2002 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LAW 990 at 1005.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. The second category of regulations – those promoting greater competition within the
profession – have encountered some resistance within the European Union. See Laurel S. Terry,
The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 29 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2009).
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encountered vigorous opposition from the US legal profession, and to
a lesser extent, from the SA profession as well.
This third category of regulations is different from the first two in
another interesting respect. Bradley Wendel has pointed out that most
of the law governing lawyers involves the “negative rights to counsel,”
i.e. the law of lawyering is primarily concerned with removing threats
to the attorney-client relationship. 44 Wendel presents the attorneyclient privilege and prohibitions on contact with represented persons
(the “no-contact rule”) as examples of such “negative rights.” In
contrast, Wendel suggests that the organized bar has given insufficient
attention to the “positive right to counsel,” i.e. access to lawyers for
poor and middle income people in civil proceedings such as family and
public benefits cases. 45
Thus, regulations in this third category – those that promote the
“positive right” of access to legal services by imposing pro bono
requirements on the legal profession, permitting non-lawyers to
provide certain categories of legal services, and regulating entry to the
profession itself – present a direct challenge to the autonomy of lawyers
to choose whom to represent and the profession’s power to regulate
who may practice law. As such, these regulations have the potential to
reshape the practice of law in both the United States and South Africa
in significant ways. It is this third category of regulations that is the
central focus of this comparative analysis.
III. REGULATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
PROFESSION
The US legal profession prides itself on what it sees as its selfregulation. This is articulated in the Preamble of the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA Rules”),
which devotes three full paragraphs to the subject. 46 The Preamble
links the principle of self-regulation to that of professional
independence:

44. See Wendel, supra note 30, at 2565.
45. See Wendel, supra note 30, at 2565-66.
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope, ¶¶ 10-12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018),
available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope
.html [https://perma.cc/7RF3-YDCW].
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[11] . . . Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s
independence from government domination. An independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a
profession whose members are not dependent on government for
the right to practice.
[12] The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it
special responsibilities of self-government . . . A lawyer should
also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of
these responsibilities compromises the independence of the
profession and the public interest which it serves. 47

Bruce Green described the way in which the ABA connects selfregulation and professional independence: “[T]he bar’s principal
rationale is that self-regulation is necessary to secure individual
lawyers’ independence. The fear is that, if the government can make
the rules for lawyers, it may make repressive rules, which undermine
lawyers’ ability to perform as independent professionals.” 48
Neither the idea of a self-regulated legal profession nor the
principle of professional independence is unique to the United States.
For example, in language paralleling that of the ABA Rules, the
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (“CCBE”) Charter of
Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct
for European Lawyers (“CCBE Charter”) draws a connection between
professional independence and self-regulation: “[T]he lawyer must be
independent of the state and other powerful interests, and must not
allow his or her independence to be compromised by improper pressure
from business associates. . . . Self-regulation of the profession is seen
as vital in buttressing the independence of the individual lawyer.” 49 The
47. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. According to the ABA, the quid pro quo for this self-regulation is that
lawyers are expected to comply with the ethical rules and ensure that their colleagues do so as
well.
48. Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?,
46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 604 (2013) (citations omitted).
49. COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS OF EUR., CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE
EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION & CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS princ. (a), at
8
(2018)
[hereinafter
CCBE
CHARTER
&
CODE],
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/DEONTOLOGY/DEO
N_CoC/EN_DEON_CoC.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KXL-AWFB]. Another example of a code of
ethics that contains provisions relating to both self-regulation and professional independence is
TAIWAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR LAWYERS OF THE TAIWAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, pmbl., art. 4, available at http://www.twba.org.tw/en/Lawyers.htm.
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CCBE Charter also lists “independence of the lawyer and the freedom
of the lawyer to pursue the client’s case” as the very first core
principle. 50
However, in the United States both self-regulation and
independence are less than they might at first appear. The US legal
profession is extensively regulated by courts, as well as legislatures and
administrative agencies. 51 The late Fred C. Zacharias went so far as to
describe self-regulation of the profession as a “myth” and observed:
Law in the United States is a heavily regulated industry . . . The
courts regulate lawyers . . . through supervisory decisions in the
course of litigation and by implementing common law civil
liability rules that govern legal practice. These include
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and other causes of action.
Administrative agencies – particularly federal agencies – also
establish and implement rules governing lawyers who practice
before them. Federal and state legislatures play a further role in
regulating the bar, providing statutory regulations and criminal
penalties that apply to lawyers. 52

As Zacharias further noted, however, despite this extensive degree of
regulation, the legal profession continues to think of itself as selfregulated and find support in that view from a number of sources. 53
The US profession’s related perception of itself as independent is
no less complicated. As Bradley Wendel notes, the definition of
independence involves a threshold question: “independent from
what?” 54 In his systematic analysis of the concept of professional
independence, Bruce Green states that the term is used in two distinct
ways: “independence from clients” and “independence from the
pressures and influences of others who might compromise lawyers’
loyalty to clients.” 55 Green observes that the ABA Rules have
surprisingly little to say about independence in either of these senses,
and that, apart from some provisions relating to the lawyer’s role as
50. CCBE CHARTER & CODE, supra note 49.
51. For a discussion of the many ways the US legal profession is regulated, see John
Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 968-71, 1051-55 (2009).
52. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1147-48
(2009) (citations omitted).
53. See id. at 1148-49.
54. See Wendel, supra note 30, at 2575.
55. See Green, supra note 48, at 607-08. Green also discusses at length individual lawyers’
independence from the judiciary. See id. at 619-38.
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advisor to the client, 56 the concept is largely buried in the sections of
the rules dealing with conflicts of interest. 57
Green’s arguments about the limited way in which professional
independence is addressed in the ABA Rules are borne out by a
comparison with the ethical codes of other countries. Unlike the ABA
Rules, most of the European ethical codes have sections devoted
exclusively to professional independence. 58 This is also true of the
CCBE Code of Conduct for European Lawyers and the International
Bar Association’s International Principles on Conduct for the Legal
Profession. 59
The codes of Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark,
Macedonia, Norway, Scotland, Spain, and Ukraine all contain
provisions relating explicitly to the two types of independence
described by Green (independence from clients and independence from
others who would compromise lawyers’ loyalty to their clients). 60
56. See Green, supra note 48, at 610-11. Green cites ABA Rule 2.1 as an example.
57. See id. at 616. Green cites ABA Rule 5.4 as an example. See id. The idea of
independence is imbedded in other conflict of interest rules as well. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in
the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”), r. 1.8(f) (“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
representing a client from one other than the client unless: . . . (2) there is no interference with
the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment. . . . ) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
58. For a compilation of Professional Regulations prepared by the CCBE, see Professional
Regulations, CCBE, http://www.ccbe.eu/documents/professional-regulations/#panel-712-0
[https://perma.cc/NE92-8BZR] (last visited Dec. 4, 2018).
59. See CCBE CHARTER & CODE § 2.1, supra note 48; INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION § 1
(2011), available at https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_
free_materials.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y84D-RGR3].
60. See NATIONAL CHAMBER OF ADVOCACY OF ALBANIA, ATTORNEY ETHICS CODE ch.
I, art. 1-3 (2005) [Alb.], available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution
/public/documents/National_Regulations/DEON_National_CoC/EN_Albania_Attorney_
Ethics_Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/92D8-699G]; FLEMISH BAR COUNCIL, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
LAWYERS
§
I.2.1
(2014)
[Belg.],
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/
DEON_National_CoC/EN_Belgium_OVB_Code_of_Ethics_for_Lawyers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QK5-YKUA]; SUPREME BAR COUNCIL, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW ETHICS CODE
§
II,
art.
3
(2005)
[Bulg.],
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/DEON_National_CoC/EN_Bu
lgaria_Attorneys_at_Law_Ethics_Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6K5-L7AW]; CYPRUS BAR
ASSOCIATION, CODE OF CONDUCT REGULATIONS § 10 (2002) [Cyprus], available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/
DEON_National_CoC/EN_Cyprus_Code_of_Conduct_Regulations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5UZ2-FXRK]; GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE DANISH LAW & BAR SOCIETY, CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR THE DANISH BAR & LAW SOCIETY § 2.1.1 (2008) [Den.],
available at
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Article I.2.1.1 of the Belgian code is one succinct example:
A lawyer is subject to obligations that require his absolute
independence, free from all pressure, especially from his own
interests or outside influence. A lawyer must avoid any
impairment of his independence and may not disregard
professional ethics to please the client, the judge or third parties.
Independence is essential in all activities. 61

The CCBE Code of Conduct for European Lawyers contains similar
language. 62 The ABA Rules do not contain any equivalent provision.63
Thus, the US legal profession is more heavily regulated and places
less importance on professional independence than the Preamble to the
ABA Rules and the profession’s own self-image would suggest. The
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/
DEON_National_CoC/EN_Denmark_Code_of_Conduct_for_the_Danish_Bar_and_Law_Soci
ety.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YG8-PWFB]; ASSOCIATES & LAWYER’S APPRENTICES OF THE
MACEDONIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF LAWYERS § 1 (2002)
[Maced.], available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/
National_Regulations/DEON_National_CoC/EN_FYROM_Code_on_professional_ethics_
of_lawyers.pdf [https://perma.cc/89G5-ESNM]; NORWEGIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF
CONDUCT
FOR
ADVOCATES
§
2.1
(2002)
[Nor.],
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/
DEON_National_CoC/EN_Norway_Rules_of_conduct_for_advocates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7S7-68TZ]; THE LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
SCOTTISH SOLICITORS AND CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CRIMINAL WORK art. 1 (2002) [Scot.],
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/
National_Regulations/DEON_National_CoC/EN_UK_Scotland_Code_of_conduct_for_solicit
ors.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YQE-3BLP]; GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE SPANISH BAR, CODE OF
CONDUCT OF THE SPANISH BAR art. 2 (2002) [Spain], available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations
/DEON_National_CoC/EN_Spain_Code_of_conduct_of_the_Spanish_Bar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AZU-VGFF]; UKRANIAN NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
§
II,
art.
6
(2012)
[Ukr.]
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/National_Regulations/
DEON_National_CoC/EN_Ukraine_UNBA_Rules_of_Professional_Conduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GHE2-ZGFJ].
61. FLEMISH BAR COUNCIL, CODE OF ETHICS FOR LAWYERS § I.2.1, art. I.2.1.1 (2014)
[Belg.], available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/
National_Regulations/DEON_National_CoC/EN_Belgium_OVB_Code_of_Ethics_
for_Lawyers.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC5K-FWES].
62. See CCBE CHARTER & CODE § 2.1.1, supra note 49.
63. Laurel S. Terry provides a thoughtful analysis of the differences between the
conceptions of independence contained in the CCBE Code of Conduct for European Lawyers
and the ABA Model Rules. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s
Legal Ethics Code Part I: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1, 45-46 (1993).
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prominence that the ideas of self-regulation and independence continue
to play can be explained in part by history. The US legal profession
began as a small, homogenous, economically and socially elite group
of lawyers operating with a significant degree of independence. 64 Over
time the profession became more formally structured and regulated.65
The profession also became more diverse, and the practice of law came
to be seen as a “business,” as well as a “profession.” 66
Despite this historical evolution, it is clearly important to both the
US Bar and individual lawyers to hold on to this image of an
independent group of professionals conducting their affairs unimpeded
by outside regulation. It is this cultural adherence to strict notions of
professional autonomy that is at the heart of the US legal profession’s
fierce opposition to the third category of regulations as described in
Section II – regulations designed to address through compulsory means
the unmet need for legal services. The ABA has so far been unwilling
to go beyond a voluntary responsibility to perform pro bono legal
services. 67 The Comments to the ABA Model Rules make this explicit,
stating: “The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be
enforced through disciplinary process.” 68 Mandatory pro bono
requirements have not been adopted for admitted lawyers in any state.69
The Bar has also resisted efforts to require lawyers to report their hours
of voluntary pro bono work, 70 although nine states now have
64. RICHARD ZITRIN, CAROL M. LANGFORD & LIZ RYAN COLE, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 6-7 (4th ed. 2013).
65. For a discussion of this history, see generally Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald,
Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach Would Improve Professional Rules
and Roles, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 516-29 (2012).
66. See generally Samuel J. Levine, Conference: The Law: Business or Profession? The
Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First
Century: Foreword, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2-4 (2012) (discussing the “business-profession
dichotomy” in a variety of contexts).
67. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1, cmt. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
69. See Joan C. Rogers, Pro Bono Is Responsibility, Not Mandate, Under Ethics Rules,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.bna.com/pro-bono-responsibilityn73014471570/ [https://perma.cc/2VMM-V4FS] (discussing state pro bono provisions and
noting, “Not a single state mandates pro bono service as a condition of staying licensed to
practice law.”).
70. See, e.g., Letter from David M. Schraver, President, New York State Bar Association,
to Honorable Jonathon Lippman, Chief Judge, State of New York (June 26, 2013), available at
http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=28656
[https://perma.cc/YPX7FCR3] (objecting to proposal to require public disclosure of pro bono hours reported as part of
biennial attorney registration). In response to these concerns, the reporting rules were eventually
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mandatory reporting, and another twelve have voluntary reporting. 71
Mandatory pro bono requirements have been successfully imposed on
law students and graduates of law schools who have not yet been
admitted to practice. This has been accomplished through the
regulations that govern bar admission requirements. 72
Additional authority for the provision of pro bono services is a
federal statute that gives federal judges authority to “request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 73 The ABA
Model Rules contain a parallel provision that makes it a general duty
of lawyers to accept such appointments from the courts. 74 Courts have
begun to use the federal statute to appoint attorneys to handle civil
representation without compensation, 75 but lawyers have sometimes
resisted such appointments. 76
Even more controversial within the US legal profession are efforts
to loosen restrictions on the work that non-lawyers may perform.
Although the Supreme Court of the State of Washington implemented
a system of “limited license legal technicians,” this was done over a
modified to make the reporting anonymous, see 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS. tit. 22, §
118.1(e)(14), and to make the information available to the public only on an aggregate basis.
See Glenn Lau-Kee, A Message From the President: Changes to Mandatory Pro Bono Reporting
Requirement, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org/probonorequirement
[https://perma.cc/P8PB-5VZG].
71. See Pro Bono Reporting, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_
public_service/ts/pbreporting.html [https://perma.cc/CH5K-R2NK].
72. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (requiring completion of
fifty hours of qualifying pro bono service as a condition for admission to practice in New York
State). In New York, admitted attorneys, while not subject to mandatory pro bono, are
encouraged to perform fifty hours of pro bono service each year and are required to report the
total of their pro bono hours in the registrations they file pursuant to Section 468-a of the New
York Judiciary Law. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 468-a (Consol. 2018). Students and lawyers not yet
admitted to practice are less powerful than admitted attorneys and therefore much easier to
regulate. See also 2017-2018 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,
standard 303(b)(2) (“A law school shall provide substantial opportunities to students for . . . (2)
student participation in pro bono legal services, including law-related public service activities.”).
73. 28 U.S.C.S § 1915(e) (LexisNexis 2018).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). The Rule sets
out three exceptions to this duty: representation is likely to result in a violation of the Model
Rules; is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or is “so repugnant
to the lawyer as to be is likely to impair the lawyer-client relationship or the lawyer’s ability to
represent the client.” Id. ¶ (c).
75. See Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 2015).
76. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). There, a lawyer,
representing himself, took his case all the way to the Supreme Court, successfully arguing, in
essence, that he was not competent to handle the pro bono case that had been assigned to him.
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vigorous dissent. 77 A similar New York initiative encountered active
opposition from some in the New York Bar, 78 but the program has
nonetheless moved forward on a limited basis in housing and civil court
matters. 79 The debate over allowing non-lawyers to perform legal
services may also be affected by a US Supreme Court case involving
dentistry. 80 In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
Federal Trade Commission, the Court cast doubt on whether a
profession may impose its own restrictions on who is permitted to
provide services to the public. 81 The case has implications for selfregulation of other professions as well, including law. 82
Part of the reason this third category – regulations designed to
address the “justice gap” in the unmet need for legal services –inspired
such vigorous opposition is that the regulations implicate two decisions
that are at the core of traditional notions of lawyer autonomy in the
United States: whom to represent and who may provide legal services.
Individual lawyers want to be able to choose their clients and, with
limited exceptions, have the freedom to do so. 83 And the profession has
jealously guarded its ability to limit the “practice of law” to lawyers. 84
A comparative discussion of the regulation of the US and SA legal
professions must therefore start with an understanding of how this
77. See In the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28, Order No. 25700-A-1005 (Wash.
2012) (Owens, J., dissenting).
78. See THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 36-39 (Nov. 2012); NASSAU
COUNTY BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF
NON-LAWYERS IN CLOSING THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE GAP, AS ADOPTED BY THE NCBA BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, RESPONDING TO THE REPORT OF THE STATE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS
TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK (2013) (opposing recommendations).
79. See Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, N.Y.
COURTS (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/SSI/pdfs/AO-42-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JXS-45TM]. There are proposals to expand this program. See also Lawrence
K. Marks, Non-Lawyers Help to Bridge the Justice Gap, N.Y. L.J. (May 1, 2017,),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202784735407/nonlawyers-help-to-bridgethe-justice-gap/?slreturn=20181022155258 [https://perma.cc/5JVD-AXEF].
80. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
81. Id. at 1116-17. The case involved an antitrust challenge to an attempt by a state Board
of Dental Examiners to prevent non-dentists from providing tooth-whitening services.
82. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Does This Hurt?: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in an AntiTrust Case Involving the Regulation of Dentists has Raised Questions About the Regulatory
Structure for Lawyers?, 102 ABA J. 22 ( 2015).
83. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 244 (4th ed. 2016).
See supra, notes 22, 23, 24 and accompanying text; LERMAN & SCHRAG supra, note 11.
84. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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perceived “American exceptionalism” shapes the US profession’s
general attitude toward constraints on autonomy in the practice of law.
As Deborah Rhode and Alice Woolley aptly observe in their
comparative analysis of the regulation of the Canadian and US legal
professions: “The central challenge is to design regulatory processes
that preserve professional independence but that also secure
professional accountability where market mechanisms are unable to do
so.” 85
IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
It is impossible to talk about the regulation (and the real or
perceived independence) of the South African legal profession without
reference to South Africa’s history of an official system of racial
segregation (apartheid). Three and a half centuries of discrimination
and oppression enforced by a system of legislative supremacy is bound
to affect the ways in which a legal profession is regulated in any
country. This is especially true where the legal profession is seen as
complicit in this history, as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Committee found of the SA legal profession. 86 However, slightly
surprisingly, regulation of the legal profession was (and is) similar to
many commonwealth countries. 87 Ellman opines that this was due to
South Africa’s aspirations “to membership in the Western rule of law

85. Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2761, 2764 (2012).
86. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) (set up in 1996 to deal
with apartheid crimes and amnesty) found that the legal profession had to take some
responsibility for upholding apartheid, despite some valiant examples of certain lawyers
furthering justice. The legal profession’s complicity, according to the TRC, was to be found in
their “uncritical acceptance of promulgated rules of law” without recourse to justice. Ultimately,
the TRC found that the legal profession failed to hold the legal system accountable to its final
objective or moral end, namely the pursuit of justice. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION, 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT OF SOUTH AFRICA 131 (1998); Heidi
Rombouts, The Legal Profession and the TRC: A Study of a Tense Relationship, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY
OF
VIOLENCE
AND
RECONCILIATION
(Feb.
2002),
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/trc/legalprofession.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT2Q-DLUS].
87. George E. Glos, Contemporary Trends in Continental and British Legal Education, 11
S. TEX. L.J. 373, 394 (1969); David McQuoid-Mason, Can't Get No Satisfaction: the Law and
Its Customers: Are Universities and Law Schools Producing Lawyers Qualified to Satisfy the
Needs of the Public?, 28 J. FOR JURID. SCI. 199, 199 (2003). Cf. ROB MCQUEEN & WESLEY W.
PUE, MISPLACED TRADITIONS: BRITISH LAWYERS, COLONIAL PEOPLE 14 (1999).
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world and because the legal system for whites was in large part a rule
of law modelled on British principles.” 88
Despite this terrible history, it is hard to ignore the fact that the
origin of South Africa’s legal profession shares distinctive similarities
with that of the United States, especially in its assertions that selfregulation is necessary for independence. Given this reality, the SA
legal profession’s calls for professional independence can be
challenged in the same way (or even more so) as the US legal
profession has been challenged. The SA legal profession, similarly to
the United States, began as a small and elitist group of lawyers 89 who
exerted extensive independence over the practice of law in the then
Cape Colony. After complaints by the profession of “overcrowding”
and competition from immigrants, the Incorporated Law Society of the
Cape of Good Hope was set up in 1883.90 One of the society’s first acts
was to prohibit non-lawyers (known as “law agents”) from the practice
of law. 91 This was done ostensibly as a response to the lack of ethics in
law agents’ practice, but the law society at the same time conveniently
ensured that the status quo of this elite group remained unchanged.92
Fast forward to 2017, and it appears that retention of the status quo
remains a theme. In fact, Klaaren points out that “the story of the legal
profession in South Africa in the last three decades can be told as the
story of what has not happened.” 93 This must be set against the fact that
88. See Stephen J. Ellman, The Struggle for the Rule of Law in South Africa, 60 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 57, 58 (2016); see also RICHARD ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994, 19-21 (1995).
89. See generally MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE
1902-1936: FEAR, FAVOUR AND PREJUDICE 222, 239 (2001) (arguing that in the very early years
[1660s through to the 1800s], legal practice was a rag-bag of legal agents and loosely named
lawyers but by the first British Charter of Justice (1827) elitism was the flavour of the day).
90. H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS
BACKGROUND 248 (1968); Jacqueline Church, Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers, in 2 THE
LAW OF S. AFR. 149 (W. A. Joubert ed., 2007). See Incorporated Law Societies Act 27 of 1883
(discussing the trust the Society gained with regulating the uniform practice, discipline and
training) (1883) (S. Afr.).
91. See H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 220 (1960); see also Pienaar and Versfeld v.
Incorp. Law Soc’y 1902 TS 11 (S. Afr.).
92. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 20-21 (arguing that lawyers are, in general, “pillars of
conservatism because they exert their considerable influence in upholding the status quo”).
93. See Jonathan. Klaaren, The South African Legal Profession and Transformation:
Lawyers in Society after 30 years, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard Abel & Hilary Sommerlad
eds.) (forthcoming) (on file with authors); see also Richard Calland, Lawyers Must Embrace
and Support Reform, MAIL & GUARDIAN (May 24, 2012), https://mg.co.za/article/2012-05-24-
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in SA not only does its constitution contemplate a “social justice”
imperative, but there is also a constitutional right to counsel, even
though, as in the US, this right is limited to certain categories of case.94
Thus, in focusing on the third and most controversial category of
regulation in South Africa, this category resonates with this social
justice imperative and can be linked directly to addressing unmet legal
need and accessing the profession. 95 For many years, the “in forma
pauperis” rule, similar to the US federal judge’s authority to request
assistance, has allowed high courts to refer indigent people in civil
matters to private practitioners. Under the rule, the private practitioner
must take the cases without compensation. 96 However, anecdotally, the
rule is not often utilized, and its effectiveness can be questioned given
that it assumes that the indigent will have the wherewithal to approach
the court in the first instance. 97
More pertinently, and in contrast to the ABA, the law societies
and the General Council of the Bar have, on the face of it,
increasingly 98 embraced the responsibility to address unmet legal needs
through mandatory pro bono legal service schemes. 99 These schemes
are usually structured on the basis that each of its members needs to
complete a minimum of hours of pro bono per year, usually around
twenty to twenty-four hours. 100 While this stands in stark contrast to
lawyers-must-embrace-and-support-reform [https://perma.cc/4PHC-H7G3] (quoting the first
Minister of Justice of democratic South Africa as characterising the Bar Councils as
“conservative cabals”).
94. The South African Constitution provides for right to counsel for those arrested,
detained and accused (§ 35(2)(c), (3)) as well as specific guarantees for minors (§ 28(1)). S.
AFR. CONST., 1996 § 28(1), 35(2)(c), 35(3).
95. J. Milton et al., Procedural rights, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 114-15 (David van Wyk et al. eds., 1994).
96. UNIFORM RULES OF COURT r. 40 (S. Afr). The rule allows for the recovery of
disbursements and other qualifications. Id.
97. This is not to say that it has been used in the last few years. For instance, during 199697, in forma pauperis matters were heard across South Africa. The SA Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development has not reported on in forma pauperis statistics in its annual
reports since its Annual Report for 1996/7977. See David J. McQuoid-Mason The Delivery of
Civil Legal Aid Services in South Africa, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S111, S1116 (2000) (citing
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR PERIOD 1 JULY 1996 TO 30 JUNE 1997 (1998)).
98. The first law society to impose mandatory hours was the Cape Law Society in 2003.
See D. Holness, Recent Developments in the Provision of Pro Bono Legal Services by Attorneys
in South Africa, 16 PER/PELJ 129, 137 (2013).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., RULES FOR THE ATTORNEY’S PROFESSION r. 25.2 (S. Afr.) (“P]ractising
members shall perform pro bono services of not less than 24 hours per calendar year, save that
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the ABA’s reluctance to go beyond voluntary responsibility, the actual
nature of the so-called mandatory rules is quasi-mandatory – that is,
while there are reporting mechanisms, there is no actual enforcement
or sanction for non-compliance or publicity measures in place. While
it is possible for a member of the public to complain that a practitioner
has refused to deliver pro bono services without good cause, if a
member does not complete his or her hours, there are no
consequences. 101 Interestingly, with respect to the question of who may
provide legal services, there has been a deafening silence regarding any
debate for non-lawyers to provide certain types of legal services, except
to contemplate, but then remove, the statutory recognition of paralegals
in South Africa’s future legislation governing legal practitioners since
the legal profession feared that “paralegals would ‘become’ attorneys
very quickly.” 102
The South African Constitution adopted in 1996 103 establishes a
general right of access to the courts together with a right of legal
representation for those arrested, detained and accused as well as
specific guarantees for minors. These provisions are captured as
follows:
Section 34: “[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can
be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent
and impartial tribunal or forum.”
Section 35(2): “everyone who is detained, including every
sentenced prisoner, has the right - (c) to have a legal practitioner
assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if
substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of
this right promptly; . . .”
an attorney who becomes a practising member during the course of a year shall perform pro rata
pro bono services.”).
101. For a discussion of the quasi-mandatory nature of the rules, see Helen Kruuse,
Vuku’zenzele (‘Arise and Act’): Lawyers and access to justice in South Africa, in HELENA
WHALEN-BRIDGE, LAWYERS AN ACCESS TO JUSTICE: CHALLENGING PRO BONO (forthcoming).
102. WITS JUSTICE PROJECT FOR THE INNOCENT & THE GRADUATE SCHOOL FOR PUBLIC
AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT’S CRIME, POLICING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMME,
JUSTICE FOR BREAKFAST: COMMUNITY PARALEGALS IN SOUTH AFRICA: OUTCOME REPORT 4
(2013),
available
at
http://nadcao.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Justice-forBreakfast_Community-Paralegals-in-South-Africa_Outcomes-Document_February-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MLT6-7SYM].
103. Similar but truncated provisions were set out in the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of
1993. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993.
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Section 35(3): “every accused person has a right to a fair trial,
which includes the right -(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned
to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if
substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of
this right promptly; . . . (o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher
court.”
Section 28(1): “every child has the right, (h) to have a legal
practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense,
in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice
would otherwise result; . . .” 104

As is clear from section 35, the SA Constitution requires the state
to provide legal aid to those facing criminal charges, but does not
explicitly include the right to legal aid in civil claims unless one is a
minor whose failure to have legal aid will result in “substantial
prejudice.” 105 This is similar to the United States, where the
constitutional right to counsel is primarily limited to criminal defense
of both adults and juveniles and is generally denied to civil litigants.106
104. S. AFR. CONST., 1996. These sections are in turn underpinned by various
international conventions and treaties. For instance, see the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, opened for
signature July 11, 2003, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/
[https://perma.cc/9AEA-3THD]. The adoption of the United Nations principles and guidelines
on Access to legal aid in Criminal Justice systems by South Africa in 2014 has arguably paved
the way for the development of legal aid systems and increased access to justice by indigent
persons in all member states. See U.N. Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in
Criminal Justice Systems, U.N. Doc. A/Res/67/187 (Mar. 28, 2013). The Johannesburg
declaration adopted in 2014 was used to motivate for inclusion of access to justice in the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals. See International Conference on Access to Legal Aid
in Criminal Justice Systems, The Johannesburg Declaration of the U.N. Principles and
Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, (June 24-26, 2014), available at
http://www.legal-aid.co.za/InternationalConference/International_Conference_on_Access_
to_Legal_Aid_in_Criminal_Justice_Systems/Home.html [https://perma.cc/A9T7-3XFP].
105. S. AFR. CONST., 1996. The courts have said the meaning of substantial prejudice is
context specific and must be determined with due regard to all the facts of a case. See S v. N
1997 (1) SACR 84 (TK). (S. Afr.). The Legal Aid Board has started to take on civil cases
incrementally, but access is difficult and subject not only to a means test, but also to a success
test. See LEGAL AID SOUTH AFRICA, LEGAL AID MANUAL 2018 (2018), available at
http://www.legal-aid.co.za/?p=56 [https://perma.cc/NF43-BKXE]; LEGAL AID SOUTH AFRICA,
LEGAL AID ACT REGULATIONS (2018), available at http://www.legal-aid.co.za/?p=56
[https://perma.cc/NF43-BKXE].
106. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (discussing felony defendants’
right to counsel in state criminal proceedings), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (discussing
juveniles’ right to counsel in delinquency proceedings), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) (denying right to counsel in civil termination of parental rights proceeding).
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While much has changed in South Africa since 1883, the selfregulation of lawyers has generally continued unimpeded through
apartheid (1948-1994) and constitutional democracy (1994-present).
Even many of the law societies retain the old apartheid provincial
names. 107 This, however, is set to change in a major way. The Legal
Practice Act of 2014 (“LPA”) attempts to move the SA legal profession
from a largely self-regulatory framework with similarities to the United
States, to a position more in keeping with the reforms in England and
Australia, that is, a co-regulatory framework, with the state playing
much more of a prominent role. 108 In particular, the government’s
actions deal directly with “who” and “whom,” with the preamble of the
LPA emphatically setting out that:
• “Access to legal services is not a reality for most South
Africans;
• the legal profession is not broadly representative of the
demographics of South Africa; and
• opportunities for entry into the legal profession are restricted in
terms of the current legislative framework; . . .”
To do this, the LPA contains provisions for the imposition of
compulsory community service for both law graduates and
practitioners. 109 (Interestingly, the language of “pro bono” is not
used.) 110

107. See Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 § 56 (S. Afr.). Even more interesting, is the fact that
attorneys and advocates admitted during the existence of the so-called independent states of
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (effectively the Bantustans created by the
apartheid government for the black population’s so-called independence) are still subject to
statutes those “countries” inherited when they became “independent.” See S. AFR. CONST., 1996
§ 8(1); L. Soc’y of the N. Provinces v. Maseka 2005 ZANWHC 19; see also P. ELLIS & A.T.
LAMEY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTITIONER: A COMMENTARY ON THE LEGAL
PRACTICE Act 1-4 (LexisNexis 2017).
108. See Laurel S. Terry et al., Trends and Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The
Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.. 2661, 2673 (2012); Duncan
Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 5 ALBERTA L. REV.. 233, 243 (2008); Noel N Semple,
Regulation, Access to Justice, and the New Legal Realism: Searching for Connections 2-3
(University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 2013-14, 2013).
109. The Legal Practice Act of 2014, §29 (S. Afr.).
110. In the light of the massive misalignment of lawyers to population demographic, the
government has also sought to control access to the profession through various measures. It
bears noting that the government, through the Ministry of Justice, entered in what was called
“The Legal Services Sector Charter” with the law societies and the GCB in 2007. The Charter –
containing various affirmative action and pro bono undertakings – needed to be controlled and

396

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

The rationale for the change has been debated extensively and
purposes ascribed to this change fall on a spectrum that raises concerns
that are valid for most jurisdictions. On the one extreme, many in the
SA legal profession oppose the future change on the basis that they see
the government as attempting to dominate legal practice, and in this
way subvert the legal system for their own ends. 111 This cohort sees
lawyer independence as integral in keeping the state honest, effectively
acting as a form of “loyal opposition” to government in that they fight
“the system” but within strict limits helping to legitimate the political
structure in general. 112 Many of these arguments are made in good
faith 113 and certainly make sense in the light of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s (“TRC”) claims that the failure of
lawyers to be independent of the SA government, or sufficiently critical
of it, led to the injustices of apartheid. 114
On the other end of the spectrum are those – mainly in government
but also other sectors – who complain that the SA legal profession has
not done anything to transform its practices to provide for two types of
access discussed earlier: first, access to the profession by those
previously disadvantaged by a racially classified political system;115

funded through a Council which the Ministry of Defence undertook to fund and establish.
Nothing was ever done by the Ministry; the Charter is de facto defunct.
111. See Johan Kruger, The Legal Practice Bill and Independence of the Legal Profession,
(Centre for Constitutional Rights 2013). See generally Green, supra note 48, at 604
(commenting on how the ABA connects self-regulation and professional independence in much
the same way, particularly the fear “is that if the government can make the rules for lawyers, it
may make repressive rules, which undermine lawyers’ ability to perform as independent
professionals.”).
112. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 19. In this vein, Duncan Webb comments that some
see co-regulation as an Orwellian term for a framework under which “lawyers undertake all of
the regulatory work subject to the supervision and shadow of intervention of government.”
Webb, supra note 108, at 234.
113. Duncan Webb attributes their beliefs – even if exaggerated – to the fact that throughout
their education and professional lives, lawyers are trained to see the law, lawyers, and legal
institutions as integral to society, necessary, and fair. See Webb, supra note 108, at 243.
114. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, 4 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT
OF SOUTH AFRICA 101 (1998).
115. Transformation of the Legal Profession: Discussion Paper, S. AFR. GOV., ¶¶ 1-2, 3.4
(1999),
https://www.gov.za/documents/transformation-legal-profession-discussion-paper
[https://perma.cc/GL9L-U8FG]; CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, TRANSFORMATION OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5-8 (2014); Shane Godfrey, The Legal Profession: Transformation and
Skills, 26 S. AFR. L.J. 91, 98-99, 119-20 (2009).
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and secondly, access to justice, understood in this context as the unmet
legal needs of the majority of the SA population. 116
This group also contains those who complain that lawyers
opposed to change have more sinister motives: that the profession
desires to suppress competition in its own economic interests (viz. a
form of protectionism). 117 Those in this group are skeptical of claims
of self-regulation in the name of the rule of law and rely on, consciously
or unconsciously, those grand theories that see professionalism as a
form of market control. 118
It is probable that the truth lies somewhere amidst these extreme
views. On the one hand, there is certainly evidence in the early drafting
of the LPA that the government, unhappy with the number of decisions
taken against its various departments by the Constitutional Court (the
apex court in South Africa), 119 wanted to open the door to controlling
the profession. 120 For example, one early provision in the Legal
Practice Bill gave wide powers to the Minister of Justice to dissolve
an integrated new regulatory structure (the Law Council) for both
advocates and attorneys “on good cause shown [that] [he] loses
confidence in the ability of the Council to perform its functions
116. Transformation of the Legal Profession: Discussion Paper, supra note 115.
117. See generally Legal Practice Bill: Public Hearings Day 1, PARLIAMENTARY
MONITORING GROUP (Feb. 18, 2013), https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15388/
[https://perma.cc/PT6J-CEPR].
118. See Andrew Boon & Avis Whyte, Charity and Beating Begins at Home: The
Aetiology of the New Culture of Pro Bono Publico, 22 LEGAL ETHICS 169, 169 (1999); see also
Richard Abel, Between Market and Statemarket and State: The Legal Profession in Turmoil, 52
MODERN L. REV. 285 (1985).
119. In 2012, the South African government announced that it wanted to undertake an
audit of court decisions by the Court given their displeasure at various courts finding against it,
leading to what the media reported as “impeding the democratisation project.” While a
university was appointed to do this work, they have never produced a report. See ANC mulls
review of Constitution, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2012, 9:36 AM),
https://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-04-anc-mulls-review-of-constitution [https://perma.cc/V439PU6H]. Despite the report in 2015 reporting positively on the Constitutional Court’s role, the
rhetoric has continued – at least in some sections of the ruling political party. See Mahlatse
Gallens, Constitutional democracy is not working, courts have too much power – ANCWL,
NEWS 24 (June 22, 2017, 12:20 PM), http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/
News/constitutional-democracy-is-not-working-courts-have-too-much-power-ancwl-20170622
[https://perma.cc/3UZW-VCJT].
120. A former leader of the Bar is quoted as having called the three government
representatives of the regulatory body “the Minister’s spies.” See IzakI Smuts, Submission to the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee regarding the Legal Practice Bill, CONSTITUTIONALLY
SPEAKING (Feb. 11, 2013), https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/smuts-sc-submission-toparliament-on-legal-practice-bill/ [https://perma.cc/GE2V-XN9T].
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effectively and efficiently, or on any other reasonable grounds.” 121 The
Bill further allowed the Minister to appoint an interim council in its
place, 122 to exercise control over important aspects such as legal
education, 123 to prescribe what should be, and to control the fees that
can be charged for legal services. 124 The late Arthur Chaskalson, the
first Chief Justice of South Africa post-apartheid, in an extra-curial
statement made the following observations:
[T]he mere fact that [the Minister] can . . . dissolve the council and
. . . appoint an interim council, is a potential threat hanging over
the heads of the council, is inconsistent with the independence of
the profession, and is calculated to secure compliance rather than
resistance from it should differences on important issues ever
surface between them. 125

Against this fear of state control is the mere fact that South Africa
is, statistically, the most unequal country in the world.126 Senior
members of the Bar and Side-Bar have recognized that this fact is
related, in part, to the Bar’s failure to live up to its relatively recent
policy of “providing representation, . . . , access to justice for indigent
persons and alternative dispute resolution.” 127 Bizos, erstwhile attorney
for Nelson Mandela commented in his submission to Parliament on the
Bill that “[m]any of us [attorneys] are concerned about what is good
for us and what is good for our group, and not what is good for the legal
121. The Legal Practice Bill of 2012 (as introduced in the National Assembly, May 30,
2012) § 14(1) (S. Afr.).
122. The Legal Practice Bill of 2012 (as introduced in the National Assembly, May 30,
2012) §§ 14(4),14(5) (S. Afr.).
123. The Legal Practice Bill of 2012 (as introduced in the National Assembly, May 30,
2012) § 94(1) (S. Afr.).
124. The Legal Practice Bill of 2012 (as introduced in the National Assembly, May 30,
2012) § 94(1) (S. Afr.).
125. Arthur Chaskalson, The Rule of Law: The importance of independent courts and
legal professions, CONSTITUTIONALLY SPEAKING (Nov. 9, 2012),
https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/arthur-chaskalson-on-independence-of-legal-profession/
[https://perma.cc/LBN8-4VBM] (emphasis added).
126. South Africa has a Gini Co-efficient (an international measurement of income or
wealth distribution in a country or region) of approximately 0.6 percent. This is consistently the
lowest of all countries on this scale. See Kruuse, supra note 101.
127. Mission Statement, GEN. COUNCIL OF THE B. OF S. AFR., ¶ 3,
http://www.sabar.co.za/about.html [https://perma.cc/7FZK-X6W5]. See Transformation of the
Legal Profession: Response by the GCB, 12 CONSULTUS 9, 9 (1999) (acknowledging that “it
has not succeeded in living out [their] commitment in all respects” and that it “acknowledges
past failures.”)
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profession as a whole nor what is good for the people of South
Africa.” 128
Bizos’s Comment implies that lawyers should be acting for the
good of the people of South Africa, presumably through increasing
legal representation for those who cannot afford to do so. This is turn
implies that Wendel’s suggestion that the US organized bar has given
insufficient attention to the “positive right to counsel,” applies equally
to the SA legal profession. 129 As in the United States, any regulations
which impose obligations on lawyers to address the justice gap have a
similar potential to reshape the practice of law in the South Africa in
significant ways.
V. AUTONOMY VS EQUALITY AS “THE” CORE PRINCIPLES IN
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA, RESPECTIVELY?
The preceding Sections provided brief descriptions of the ways in
which the legal professions of the United States and South Africa are
regulated, and the recent attempts to use these systems of regulation to
address inequities in the two societies. The two countries provide an
interesting comparison, because they are racially diverse and
characterized by serious economic inequality between rich and poor,
even if the United States and South Africa differ radically in general
development terms. In both countries, regulation of the legal profession
has traditionally focused on defining the standards of practice and the
duties owed to clients, courts, and third parties; and prescribing
discipline for violations of those standards.
But as discussed in Section II, efforts are now underway to move
regulation into an entirely new realm: moving from regulating the
“how” – how lawyers should represent clients – to the “who” and
“whom” – who should practice law and whom lawyers should
represent. These efforts are designed to equalize access to law and
lawyers throughout society. 130 However, as discussed above, in both
countries these efforts sparked debates about whether such regulation
is an appropriate means of addressing these societal problems. 131 The
key question at the heart of these debates is whether it is appropriate to
128. Kim Hawkey, A step closer: Oral hearings on the Legal Practice Bill, 529 DE REBUS
22, 22-37 (2013).
129. See Wendel, supra note 30, 2565-66.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 cmt. 1, 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
131. See supra, notes 69-71, 101-04 and accompanying text.
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use regulation of the profession in this way, i.e., achieving social
change through fundamental changes in the way the legal profession is
regulated. This is, at heart, a means-ends issue: taking as a given that
the intended ends (a more racially and economically just and equal
society) are highly desirable, is regulation of the profession the
appropriate means for achieving this end?
This Article has already considered the various underlying
political, social, and economic contexts in each country. 132 However,
in order to properly deal with this question we also need to consider the
different requirements or principles in each legal system and how these
requirements may affect the lawyer’s role. 133 Despite many common
features, as described above, in the histories of the legal professions in
both countries, and the similar problems of racial and economic
inequality, there are important cultural differences that may justify
different approaches to regulation of the profession.
In the United States, it is useful to look to the purpose of its
constitution which, US Supreme Court Justice Brennan once observed,
is “a charter of human rights, dignity and self-determination”. 134 If the
main requirement of US law is to protect an individual’s autonomy or
self-determination, and an ordinary person cannot exercise autonomy
without the help of a lawyer, 135 then a lawyer’s first and foremost
commitment is to enhance the client’s autonomy. This requires giving
the lawyer autonomy as well as to make representational choices about
what clients to represent and how to represent them, as long as the
actions of the lawyer and client are legal. This is the basic argument of

132. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 10.
133. See LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra note 7; LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD, supra note 7; LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE
THEORIES, supra note 7; DAMAŠKA, supra note 9; Kritzer, supra note 7.
134. Freedman & Smith, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS 7 (Carolina Academic Press
2016).
135. See Duncan Webb, Bounded Autonomy and Bounded Zeal, 28 U. QUEENSLAND L. J.
273, 281 (2009) (noting that “lawyers are an essential corollary to any meaningful selfdetermination”).
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many US legal ethicists, including Stephen Pepper 136, Charles Fried,137
and Monroe Freedman 138, who argue forcefully that autonomy serves
as the root justification for an ethical role for lawyers. Thus, enhancing
the autonomy of individuals should be seen as the proper goal, end, or
“good” in lawyering as it is an explicit requirement of the US legal
system.
In addition, as discussed above in Part II, the idea of selfregulation and professional independence is a fundamental aspect of
the way lawyers in the United States see themselves. Even if this notion
is actually a “myth,” it is a powerful and enduring one within the US
legal profession. 139 In contrast, equality rather than autonomy has been
said to be the “organising” principle behind the SA legal system, at
least post-Constitution. 140 This is not surprising given South Africa’s
historic context of inequality.
In this light, Constitutional Court Justice Kriegler comments:
“The supreme laws of comparable constitutional states may underscore
other principles and rights. But in the light of our own particular
history, and our vision for the future, our constitution was written with
equality at its centre. Equality is our Constitution’s focus and
organising principle.” 141 South Africa’s Constitutional Court, despite

136. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES J. 613, 617 (1986). Cf. David Luban, The
Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637
(1986) (objecting to Pepper’s characterization in that he sees Pepper as overvaluing individual
autonomy).
137. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060, 1071 (1976).
138. See Monroe Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH.
UNIV.CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 197 (1970).
139. Zacharias, supra note 52, at 1147-49.
140. See, e.g., Justice Moseneke’s words in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6)
SA 121 (CC) at paras. 23-24 (S. Afr.) (“For good reason, the achievement of equality
preoccupies our constitutional thinking. When our Constitution took root a decade ago our
society was deeply divided, vastly unequal and uncaring of human worth. Many of these stark
social and economic disparities will persist for long to come. In effect the commitment of the
Preamble is to restore and protect the equal worth of everyone; to heal the divisions of the past
and to establish a caring and socially just society. … Our supreme law says more about equality
than do comparable constitutions.”).
141. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)
at 68, ¶ 74 (S. Afr.).
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resisting an explicit strict “hierarchy of rights” in its Constitution,142
has effectively confirmed Justice Kriegler’s comments in its
jurisprudence, stating that the equality provision is “a core value”;143
“lies at the heart of the Constitution”; 144 “permeates and defines” the
Constitution’s ethos; 145 “assumes special importance”; 146 and “goes to
the bedrock of [SA’s] Constitutional architecture”. 147
This Article recognizes that, even without these cultural
differences, there may be a deep, philosophical basis for any legal
profession in any jurisdiction not wanting to impose pro bono work on
practitioners. Commentators have raised concerns that, by forcing
practitioners to do pro bono, it undermines the practitioners’
appreciation for the moral significance of pro bono and it compromises
their existing altruistic commitments. 148 In this way, practitioners’
judgments are short-circuited and prescription replaces deliberation
about one’s professional responsibility.
The first two areas of regulation that have been discussed
(discipline and antitrust provisions) benefit from the certainty and
efficiency that codes and rules provide, least of all as a way to signal to
the public how a lawyer will act in representing them. However, this
third category of regulation – obedience to a rule to “act for the public
good” – has limited value of this sort, as it fails to provide a substantive
source of motivation as to why lawyers should provide, if not pro bono
work, then representation for the indigent at reduced rates.
The goal of developing a self-generated pro bono mindset is
nonetheless laudatory. But cultural differences may well influence
different approaches to achieving this goal, and what may distinguish
the US legal profession from the SA legal profession is its focus on
142. See e.g., Johncom Media Inv. Ltd. v. M and Others 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) (S. Afr.); see
South African Broad. Corp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Dir. Of Pub. Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
143. Minister of Educ. And Another v. Syfrets Trust Ltd. NO and Another 2006 (4) SA 205
(C) at 24, ¶ 30 (S. Afr.).
144. Fraser v. Children’s Court Pretoria N. and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) at 16, ¶ 20
(S. Afr.).
145. Brink v. Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 18-19 ¶ 33 (S. Afr.).
146. Bhe and Others v. Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 45 ¶
71 (S. Afr.).
147. Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 14 ¶ 22 (S. Afr.).
148. See Marvin E. Frankel, Proposal: A National Legal Service, 45 S.C. L. REV. 887,
890-91 (1994). Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law
Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2421 (1999).
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autonomy. If the US legal profession sees this “third type” of regulation
as inconsistent with deeply ingrained notions of professional
autonomy, it will not succeed. It is likely that US lawyers will feel that
they are being unfairly burdened with the responsibility of addressing
social inequities. And clients will not be well-served by having lawyers
who may not actually want to represent them. In addition, there is no
guarantee that lawyers who are assigned to pro bono clients will have
the skills necessary to meet the clients’ needs. A better approach, both
philosophically and practically, may be to provide greater public
funding of legal services specifically targeted to indigent clients 149, or
failing that, to loosen unauthorized practice of law restrictions to make
it possible for specially trained non-lawyer professionals to assist
indigent clients with a carefully defined range of legal services.
In South Africa, on the other hand, this “third way” of regulating
the profession may have a much greater chance of succeeding, because
“equality,” rather than “autonomy”, is the core societal value.150
Further, as mentioned earlier, history must be an important instrument
in the interpretation of the SA legal system’s constitution, 151 and in our
context, the interpretation of the legal profession’s role in that legal
system.
But this “third way” has some shortfalls. It does not deal with
another part of South Africa’s history, a history which has (correctly)
alerted legal professionals to be extremely cautious and skeptical of
government’s attempts to interfere in the workings of its legal system.
The other issue, similar to the United States, is to ask who should be
the primary provider of access to legal services in any jurisdiction.
149. This is the approach New York City has recently taken for housing court proceedings.
See Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation to Provide Low-Income New Yorkers with Access to
Counsel for Wrongful Evictions, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Aug. 11,
2017),
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/547-17/mayor-de-blasio-signslegislation-provide-low-income-new-yorkers-access-counsel-for#/0 [https://perma.cc/HR2Y4R72].
150. This is not to say that “autonomy” does not feature in the SA legal system or
“equality” in the US legal system, just that the emphasis is the result of the peculiar history of
each jurisdiction.
151. See Pierre de Vos, A Bridge Too Far - History as Context in the Interpretation of the
South African Constitution, 17 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1, 33 (2001). It should be noted that de
Vos qualifies his reliance on history as an important interpretative tool. He directs the interpreter
(judges in his context) to avoid “the rigid, exclusive and nationalistic version of history.” Id.
However, to embrace a version of history that is “sensitive to the insights of post structuralism.”
Id. at 32.
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A possible response to the first issue is simply for the SA legal
profession to regulate itself more rigorously on pro bono before the
government does. In this way, the government cannot use the excuse
of pro bono as a pretext or “foot in the door” for more insidious means
of undermining the progressive stance of the courts vis-à-vis
government policy. Sounding a warning, Gauntlett noted in 2013 (in
relation to government’s proposed regulatory intrusion): “Without
independent courts, there are no rights in the country; without
independent lawyers, there are no independent courts,” concluding that
‘‘[i]t is we [viz. the legal profession] who have to do this, not some big
brother in Pretoria.” 152
In relation to the second issue, given the express access to courts
and access to representation provisions in SA’s constitution, it is clear
that the government ought to do more to promote the access to justice
sector by prioritizing spending. 153 However, the fact that this should be
done, is not inconsistent with a duty on the SA legal profession to assist
in this regard. These duties are mutually supportive rather than
mutually exclusive. 154
VI. CONCLUSION
The legal professions of both the United States and South Africa
have a tradition of relative independence, although both have been
regulated in similar ways through disciplinary systems and antitrust
provisions. Both systems set standards for lawyers’ representation of
their clients and impose discipline for professional misconduct. And
both systems have regulations that are designed to facilitate
competition among lawyers and firms within the private sector of the
profession.

152. Kim Hawkey & Mapula Sedutla, Who Guards the Guardians? Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 28 DE REBUS 29 (2013) (quoting Jeremy Gauntlett S.C.). Pretoria is one of the three
capital cities of South Africa, serving as the seat of the executive branch of government.
153. For example, securing greater access for the indigent through its Legal Aid Board
(the statutory body responsible to realizing sections 34-35 of the SA Constitution, alternative
forms of dispute resolution (see e.g., The Traditional Courts Bill, GG 40487 (Dec. 9, 2016)) and
proposed regulation of paralegals (despite not impacting on reserved lawyer work)).
154. We are indebted to Chris McConnachie for pointing this out. See ELLIS & LAMEY,
supra, note 107, at 1-10 (“[The] enjoyment of a freedom goes hand in hand with an obligation.”).
In terms of the legal profession in South Africa, Ellis and Lamey, argue that the freedom to
choose a calling or profession “brings with it the obligation to advance access to justice and not
to restrict it.” Id.
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In addition, both societies are racially, ethnically, and socially
diverse, and both share a history of institutionalized racism. One of the
consequences of this history is a high degree of economic inequality,
including significant unmet legal needs for low income people.
To attempt to address these societal problems, both countries have
begun to attempt to implement a third type of regulation of the legal
profession, in which lawyers are required to represent low income
individuals through mandatory pro bono and other means as part of
their professional obligations. In addition, South Africa is attempting
to use similar regulations to diversify the profession.
Despite the similarities between the two countries, this Article
argues that this third type of regulation is more likely to succeed in
South Africa than in the United States, because of important differences
in the core values that are at the heart of the respective legal systems.
In the United States, the deeply held notions of professional autonomy
have led to resistance to any efforts to tell lawyers whom to represent.
For this reason, attempts to address social inequities through regulation
of the profession may ultimately fall far short of their goals or fail
altogether. Thus, rather than pursuing this third type of regulation,
efforts in the United States to address unmet legal needs and societal
inequality should rely to a greater extent on alternative approaches,
such as greater public funding of legal services for the poor and perhaps
a loosening of unauthorized practice of law restrictions.
In contrast, such an approach to regulation is more likely to
succeed in South Africa, where the core value of the legal profession
is, or at least should be, equality. Social justice initiatives such as
diversifying the profession and mandating pro bono services are
consistent with and reinforcing of this core value. The preference
though is that the legal profession can come closer to the equality ideal
without having government interfere.
These approaches are, of course, not mutually exclusive. In both
societies, there is much work to be done, and the legal professions of
both countries must be in the forefront of addressing these deeply
entrenched issues of racial and economic inequality.
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